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Abstract 
 
During his quest for leadership of the English Conservative Party David Cameron 
declared his intention to turn Britain into a Big Society. In May 2010, having 
gained office as Prime Minister, he unveiled a string of policies to bring his vision 
to fruition. Five years later, however, talk of the Big Society has withered in 
public debate such that today only the press refer to it and then as a policy in 
decline. This paper argues that as an attempt to revitalise citizenship and local 
communities, and deal with the apparent ills of state centralism and liberal 
atomism, it was destined to fail. This is because it coincided, intentionally some 
have said, with an austerity crisis that made talk of the Big Society politically 
feasible; left Big Capitalism, the cause of austerity, untouched; was seemingly 
reticent to divert power to localities; under-theorised the nature and complexity 
of modern communities; and was an attempt at depoliticisation by diverting risk 
to such bodies as charities and schools. 
 
Less state, more society 
 
In 1987, in an interview with Women’s Own magazine, Prime Minister Thatcher 
said: 
I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people 
have been given to understand ‘I have a problem, it is the Government's 
job to cope with it!’ or ‘I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope 
with it!’ ‘I am homeless, the Government must house me!’ and so they are 
casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such 
thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no 
government can do anything except through people and people look to 
themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves… There is no such 
thing as society. There is living tapestry of men and women and people 
and the beauty of that tapestry and the quality of our lives will depend 
upon how much each of us is prepared to take responsibility for ourselves 
and each of us prepared to turn round and help by our own efforts those 
who are unfortunate. (Thatcher, 1987) 
For some her statement encapsulated the age, the individualism of self-seeking 
consumers and the Hobbesian-like belief that life was ‘nasty, brutish and short’ 
for the unsuccessful (Hobbes, 1651/2008, p.86). Such assumptions were 
combined with policies that would ‘roll back the state’ and so diminish the part it 
had played since the middle of the twentieth century in providing public services, 
like public transport, unemployment benefit and free dental care. Now 
individuals were to rely more upon their willingness and ability to survive and for 
markets to provide solutions to individual needs. For those who were unfortunate 
or without sufficient wit to understand the nature of this Darwinian game, there 
would always be a minimum of state provision and, as in Dickensian times, 
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philanthropy. Some commentators epitomised the age as one dominated by self-
seeking, wealth-creating adventurists whose concern for society was limited to 
voluntary and occasional acts of compassion:  
The active citizen of Thatcherism was a law abiding, materially 
successfully individual who was willing and able to exploit the 
opportunities created by the promotion of market rights, while 
demonstrating occasional compassion for those less fortunate than 
themselves – charity rather than democratic citizenship was to be the 
main instrument of ‘active citizenship’. (Faulks, 2006) 
 
The Blair years followed with little change in the assumption about the benefits 
of a ‘modern dynamic economy’ (Blair, 1998) and the role of the citizen within it. 
In 1998 Prime Minister Blair coined the phrase the Third Way in an attempt to 
position his government not too far to the left, where it had become traditional 
for the state to intervene in individuals’ lives for reasons of social equity, and not 
too far to the right, where it would be accused of matching too closely policies of 
his former ideological enemies in the Conservative Party who seemed to deny 
that society existed independently of competing individuals. Although Thatcher 
had once called Blair her ‘greatest achievement’ (Independent, 2013), the Third 
Way was an attempt to gain credence from the broadest political footing with a 
new concept of citizenship at its centre: ‘Rebuilding Britain as a strong 
community, with a modern notion of citizenship at its heart, is the political 
objective for the new age’ (Blair, 1993). 
 
Then in 2005, in his leadership speech to the Conservative Party, David Cameron 
announced: ‘There is such a thing as society, it's just not the same thing as the 
state’ (Cameron, 2005; see also Cameron, 2010). Thus while Thatcher had 
dismissed big government for its inefficiency as a service provider, for the way it 
inhibited wealth creation and fabricated dependency upon it, Cameron 
signposted his distinct reading of the relationship between state and the 
individual. In 2009 he declared: ‘The state has promoted not social solidarity, but 
selfishness and individualism’ and explained the enigma thus: 
The paradox at the heart of big government is that by taking power and 
responsibility away from the individual, it has only served to individuate 
them.  What is seen in principle as an act of social solidarity has in practice 
led to the greatest atomisation of our society.  The once natural bonds that 
existed between people - of duty and responsibility - have been replaced 
with the synthetic bonds of the state - regulation and bureaucracy. 
(Cameron, 2009a) 
His solution was the Big Society: 
This means a new role for the state: actively helping to create the big 
society; directly agitating for, catalysing and galvanising social renewal… 
We need to create communities with oomph – neighbourhoods who are in 
charge of their own destiny, who feel if they club together and get involved 
they can shape the world around them. (Cameron, 2009b) 
Cameron presented it in such a way that the reduction of state centralisation 
would work in parallel with the regeneration of active citizenship and growth of 
local responsibility through the development of social networks and communal 
action. In part it was a reaction to Blair’s ‘authoritarian statism’ (Scraton, 2004), 
such as the proposal for the 2006 Terrorism Act that would have extended the 
period of detention of British citizens (‘suspected terrorists’) for up to 90 days 
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without charge, and in part it was a belief that by shrinking Big Government trust 
in communities would flourish and become the catalyst for the generation of 
socially-cohesive ties. The Big Society, in short, would stimulate community 
empowerment where ‘the state has promoted not social solidarity, but selfishness 
and individualism’ (Cameron, 2009b; see also Glasman, 2010, p.61). Moreover, it 
was said to be an integral part of Conservative history: ‘…there is a strong liberal, 
civic tradition within Conservative thinking, stretching back from Edmund Burke 
through to Michael Oakeshott, that celebrates the small and local over the big 
and central’ (Cameron, 2009b). 
 
Communitarianism – between the individual and the state 
 
If the state was too big and liberal individualism too redolent of isolated citizens 
increasingly unmoved by ‘duty and responsibility’, Cameron’s solution was to 
rekindle Conservative communitarianism. Communitarianism would not only 
counter the burgeoning size of the modern state and curb the excesses of 
atomism but, as part of the conservative tradition, would appeal across a 
spectrum of political allegiances that coalesced around the core belief that social 
organisations were most virtuous when based upon small, self-governing 
communities. In what follows the paper bypasses romantic-socialist advocates of 
communitarianism like Robert Owen, with his ambitious vision for Harmony 
Hall (1839-45), as well as communitarian critics of liberal excess like Amitai 
Etzioni (2015), Michael J. Sandel (2009) and Charles Taylor (1985). Here there is 
only space to outline its conservative lineage, stretching from Edmund Burke in 
the eighteenth century to Phillip Blond today, the principal architect of 
Cameron’s Big Society vision. 
 
Burke had cast the French revolutionaries in the latter stages of the 1700s as 
‘turbulent, discontented men …puffed up with personal pride and arrogance, 
(who) generally despised their own order’ (Burke, 1790/1968, p.135). These he 
contrasted with ordinary folk from communities that were the local source of 
affection for the nation and, ultimately, mankind: 
To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in 
society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is 
the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our 
country, and to mankind. (ibid., p.135) 
Burke’s idea of ‘little platoons’ carried with it the normality of rank and 
naturalness of station, as well as the assumption of the need for social order to be 
built upon such pillars, that acted as bulwarks against the claims of an 
overwhelming state and the intrusion of revolutionaries like Thomas Paine and 
his trumped-up Rights of Man. Later in the twentieth century, conservative 
communitarianism resurfaced in the United States with Nisbet’s The Quest for 
Community (1953/1990) that berated the tendency of advanced liberal societies 
to be blighted by alienation:  
By alienation I mean the state of mind that can find a social order remote, 
incomprehensible, or fraudulent; beyond real hope or desire; inviting 
apathy, boredom, or even hostility. The individual not only does not feel a 
part of the social order; he has lost interest in being a part of it. (Nisbet, 
1990, xxiii)  
As Nisbet saw it, the problem was liberalism’s propensity to create abject 
individualism that accompanied the centralising tendencies of the modern state:  
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‘…the modern state is inseparable from its successive penetrations of man’s 
economic, religious, kinship, and local allegiances, and its revolutionary 
dislocations of established centres of function and authority’(Nisbet, 2008, p.2). 
Like Burke’s platoons, ‘the liberal heritage’ was said to depend for its very 
survival upon ‘the subtle, infinitely complex lines of habit, tradition, and social 
relationship’ (ibid. p. xxiii). In the first edition of the Twilight of Authority he 
wrote: ‘The centralization, and, increasingly, individualization of power is 
matched in the social and cultural spheres by a combined hedonism and 
egalitarianism, each in its own way a reflection of the destructive impact of power 
on the hierarchy that is native to the social bond’ (1975, introd, & p. 238). Only a 
flourishing civil society with an active citizenry could adequately mediate 
between the individual and state: ‘You cannot oppose the inexorable growth of 
state power by championing individualism alone. You can only oppose it by 
championing community’, as Douthat put it recently in an explanation of Nisbet’s 
prescience today (Douthat 2012). In 1975 the conservative attraction to 
communitarianism re-emerged once more with Reagan’s pre-presidential appeal 
for: 
…an end to giantism, for a return to the human scale – the scale that 
human beings can understand and cope with; the scale of the local 
fraternal lodge, the church congregation, the block club, the farm 
bureau…. It is activity on a small, human scale that creates the fabric of 
community. . . . The human scale nurtures standards of right behaviour, a 
prevailing ethic of what is right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable. 
(Reagan, 1975)  
 
Conservative communitarianism today 
 
Cameron’s vision of a Big Society embraced this conservative version of 
communitarianism. In Civic Conservatism (1994) and Renewing Civic 
Conservatism (2008) David Willetts, Conservative MP for Havant, had argued 
for a reconciliation between the benefits of a free-market economy that brought 
prosperity and freedom, with the ‘non-market moral values on which it depends’ 
(Willetts, 2008. See also Sandel, 2012, who more recently developed the theme of 
‘moral limits of markets’). Willetts maintained that Thatcher’s world had been 
wrongly caricatured as one ‘red in tooth and claw in which the devil takes the 
hindmost’ for it obfuscated traditional conservatism that always had placed ‘as 
much importance on our shared values and our sense of community as it did on 
the role of private property and free markets’ (ibid. p.2). What gave ‘communities 
backbone and shape’, he maintained, was nurtured in the love of ‘English 
institutions’, a respect for ‘the wisdom in traditions’ (ibid. p.17, mirroring Burke’s 
‘wisdom of the ages’) and for the other-regarding virtues of the charitable 
philanthrope, which he curiously likened to a vampire bat: 
As we know from all the best horror movies, vampire bats need regular 
supplies of fresh blood. They have had a bad press but I want to change all 
that. They have been misunderstood. We have now discovered that the 
vampire bats which come back from a night’s hunting with lots of blood 
regurgitate some to share it with the other vampire bats who were less 
successful. This is not just restricted to their immediate relatives. It 
enables the colony to thrive. (ibid. p.11) 
In yet more figurative language Willetts summed up his vision of 
communitarianism thus: ‘We should think of society as being like a dry stone wall 
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or a masonry arch, holding together without social cement. The task of 
Government is to create the environment in which the social norms and 
institutions which enable reciprocity can flourish’ (ibid. p.17). 
 
Phillip Blond, Cameron’s so-called ‘communitarian intellectual’, the theoretical 
overseer of the Big Society and author of Red Toryism (2010)  Red Tory: How 
Left and Right Have Broken Britain and How We Can Fix It, London: Faber, 
2010, argued at the time that British Conservatism was still viewed as the party of 
free market economics and that this had degenerated ‘into monopoly finance, big 
business and deregulated global capitalism’ (Blond, 2009, p.1; see also Norman, 
2010). Britain had become: 
…a bi-polar nation, a bureaucratic, centralised state that presides 
dysfunctionally over an increasingly fragmented, disempowered and 
isolated citizenry. The intermediary structures of a civilised life have been 
eliminated, and with them the Burkean ideal of a civic, religious, political 
or social middle, as the state and the market accrue power at the expense 
of ordinary people. (Blond, 2009, p.2) 
Cameron’s quest for ‘the tradition of communitarian civic conservatism’ or 
Blond’s Red Toryism would strike off in a new direction. The liberal notion that 
individual autonomy must precede everything was a misguided assumption - ‘a 
“self” is a fiction’ (ibid.p.2). On the other hand, neither was more government the 
answer because of the state’s propensity to be deployed ‘in favour of the owner 
and entrepreneur’ that had led with Thatcher to the ‘escalation of monopoly’ 
(ibid. p.4), accompanying social dysfunction and the development of an 
underclass. The alternative, argued Blond, was to re-localise the banking system, 
develop local capital and break up business monopolies by breaking with big 
business (ibid. p.5). This would involve a drive toward localism that would 
require the devolvement of procurement processes to local bodies and, because 
‘the great disaster of the last 30 years is the destruction of the capital, assets and 
savings of the poor’, restore capital to labour. In short, Red Toryism would 
embrace ‘an organic communitarianism that graces every level of society with 
merit, security, wealth and worth’ (ibid. p.6). 
 
However, in the last five years since the initial ferment, Big Society rhetoric has 
quietly faded from British politics. By 2011 even Blond was claiming that ‘the 
drive for cuts and deficit reduction is perhaps running too fast to give people the 
chance to take over the state and create the conditions for a civic economy’ 
(Butler, 2011). More recently, in July 2014, the Big Society Network, the body set 
up to organise community work and volunteering, was being wound down and 
investigated by the National Audit Office and the Charity Commission for the 
way it secured and disbursed taxpayer-funded grants (National Audit Office, 
2014: see also Wright, 2014). Prime Minister Cameron oversaw many policy 
initiatives where central government had clearly chosen to withdraw power 
from, not disburse power to, local communities. Locally Authority maintained 
Secondary Schools, for example, were being pressurised to become government 
or business-controlled Academies. Likewise, the authority of local councils to 
determine energy efficiency standards for new homes (Deregulation Bill, 2014) 
was withdrawn and replaced with central directives to which local pressure 
groups strongly objected: ‘The big builders appear to have more control over 
policy than the local council’ (Transition Bath, 2014). Thus, five years after the 
start of the initiative, talk of the Big Society has become far less voluble in 
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political circles and, when it periodically resurfaces in the press, is represented as 
‘a policy in tatters’ (Wright, 2014).  
 
The reasons are fivefold. First, the Big Society coincided (some would say 
intentionally) with an ‘austerity crisis’ that made the will to localism untenable. 
Second, it failed to address the effects of what Reagan vilified as ‘giantism’ or 
what we shall call Big Capitalism. Third, the push to localism was not only 
undermined by underfunding but also threated by unwarranted market 
competition and a predilection for privatisation. Fourth, the complexity of what a 
community is today was under-theorised and misrepresented by the dated 
Burkean notion of ‘little platoons’.  And fifth, the Big Society was an attempt to 
off-load political risk by raising the role and status of philanthropy and de-
politicizing charities as service providers, a policy mirrored in more recent 
changes to the national curriculum for Citizenship in England. We take these in 
turn. 
 
A time of austerity or public spending cuts? 
 
The launch of the Big Society coincided with what was euphuistically called ‘a 
time of austerity’. When the Coalition Government came to power in May 2010 it 
inherited a financial crisis with rising national debt: 
The Coalition Government inherited one of the most challenging fiscal 
positions in the world. Last year, Britain’s deficit was the largest in its 
peacetime history - the state borrowed one pound for every four it spent. 
The UK currently spends £43 billion on debt interest, which is more than 
it spends on schools in England. (H M Treasury, 2010, p.5) 
The Coalition’s response was to impose cuts upon the welfare budget, the police 
force, libraries, Legal Aid, the Citizens Advice Bureau and in particular Local 
Authorities (Crawford & Phillips, 2012). For some the rhetoric of the state being 
too big and unaffordable masked ‘the systematic depletion of collective resources 
for civic and community action’ (Tam, 2011, p.32). The Labour Party, favouring a 
Keynesian approach, questioned the need for an austerity programme suggesting 
that only after economic recovery should cuts be imposed, while Blyth, in 
Austerity: the History of a Dangerous Idea, argued that not only would the 
policy of depleting state spending fail to repair the economy, it could never work: 
Hippocratic economics… we have a strange way of looking at things 
whereby markets are strange, virginal creatures that have been assaulted 
by the state, and what we’re doing with austerity is restoring its purity… 
this is nonsense… Everyone cutting at the same time is ludicrous. To have 
savings you have to have income from which to save. If you’re not 
generating income there’s no point… grow and then pay back debt. (Blyth, 
2013)  
The New Economics Foundation suggested that the austerity programme was 
made ‘politically feasible’ by talk of the Big Society and argued that the two 
policies were interlocked - ‘two sides of the same coin’ - where poor individuals 
and communities would suffer the most (NEF, 2010, p.6; see also NEF, 2012).  
 
Moreover, the cause of the need for austerity, the collapse of deregulated banks 
and large international corporations, remained largely untouched in Big Society 
rhetoric. For some commentators, the people and institutions that caused the 
2008 market crash seemed inviolate: ‘…there was no comparable attempt to open 
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up business, especially large corporations, to greater influence by the public or to 
redistribute some of their fast expanding wealth-based power to the more 
powerless sections of society’ (Tam, 2011, p.33). Levitas pointed out that the 
Government had chosen not to reduce the national deficit by taxing the rich who 
suffered less because of the crash (Levitas, 2012), but that, on the contrary, in 
April 2013 it lowered the income tax threshold of those earning more than 
£150,000 from 50p to 45p in the pound. Such policies, she explained, ‘blame the 
values of the poor for their poverty and justify inequality’ (Levitas, 2012, p.330). 
Taylor-Gooby and Stoker argued that if ‘the spending programme is analysed, the 
cuts in services for poorer groups substantially outweigh the impact of tax 
increases on higher-rate taxpayers’ (Taylor-Goodby & Stoker, 2011., p.8). Even 
the Archbishop of Canterbury expressed scepticism for what he saw as a move 
away from social accountability and questioned who would perform the state’s 
role in providing mechanisms for ensuring fairness and justice across society: 
‘We need reassuring that the Big Society isn't just an alibi for cuts, and a way 
back to Government just washing its hands’ (Williams, 2010). Thus the politico-
economic policy of the Coalition Government and its hesitancy in dealing with 
Big Capitalism and redistribution was said to be in tension with very 
devolvement, mutuality and sense of solidarity that underpinned the Big 
Society’s quest for stable community associations (see Glasman, 2010, p.62). In 
short, the policy of countering ‘the growth and pervasiveness of the state’ 
(Norman, 2010) had ‘a hollow feel to it’ (Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012, p.28). 
 
Localism or privatisation? 
 
The move to localism was a parallel concern. Some considered it an uncertain 
promise and others a ploy to underfund local services or encourage privatisation 
by clandestine means. Above we suggested that the rationale for the impulse 
towards localism was that the state was said to create dependency (Norman, 
2010), dissolve personal responsibility (Cameron, 2010), destroy subsidiarity 
(Blond, 2009), stifle local and specialised forms of originality (Glasman, 2010) 
and create egoists and individualism (Cameron, 2009; Blond, 2010). In contrast, 
the Big Society would counter ‘the growth and pervasiveness of the state’ 
(Norman, 2010, p33ff), prompt the move ‘from central to local government’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2010) and the Localism Act of 2011 would allow ‘communities 
the right to buy public assets and run public services’ (Blond, 2009, p2; see 
Dawson, 2013, p.88):  
Greater freedom and flexibilities for local government are vital for 
achieving the shift in power the government wants to see. But, on their 
own, these measures will not be enough. Government alone does not make 
great places to live, people do. People who look out for their neighbours, 
who take pride in their street and get involved - from the retired teacher 
who volunteers in the village shop once a month, to the social 
entrepreneur who runs the nursery full time. 
Until now, however, many people have found that their good ideas have 
been overlooked and they have little opportunity to get on and tackle 
problems in the way they want. Voluntary and community groups often 
find that their potential contribution is neglected, when, in fact, they carry 
out some of the most innovative and effective work in public services and 
we should be encouraging them to get more involved. 
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We want to pass significant new rights direct to communities and 
individuals, making it easier for them to get things done and achieve their 
ambitions for the place where they live. (Localism Act, 2011) 
 
For many, while the policy showed traces ‘of an ideological commitment to 
localism and a new understanding of local self-government’, in practice it was 
‘diluted by the political expediency of budget cuts’ (Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012, 
p.22). In 2010 under the logic of austerity the Department for Communities and 
Local Government implementing a 27 per cent cut in its local government budget 
with a 51 per cent cut in its community’s budget over four years (see Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, 2010). In their April 2010 election manifesto the Liberal 
Democrats had called for Local Councils to be given more powers to raise 
revenue. However, in the following month, having joined with the Conservative 
Party to form the Coalition, the policy was discarded (Liberal Democrat 
Manifesto, 2010; see also Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012, p.35). Similarly, while 
central government quotas for rural housing development were made obligatory, 
local councils’ power to decide policies on planning applications remained 
heavily regulated and frequently contested by community groups (e.g. It’s Our 
Country, 2014). While Tesco and other large supermarkets continued in their 
dominance of the grocery market, to which Blond referred as illustrative of the 
damaging effect of Big Capitalism upon the fabric of local communities, the 
status quo prevailed despite opposition from local pressure groups (e.g. 
Tescopoly, 2014). In parallel, financially strapped councils were rendered 
incapable of combating planning applications for fear of the cost of legal 
reprisals. Thus, in reality, the  Localism Act did not devolve power to locally 
elected representatives and away from big business, but to other, centrally 
determined bodies such as Michael Gove’s free schools (Observer, 2014), Andrew 
Lansley’s GP commissioning consortia (Guardian, 2011), Theresa May’s elected 
police chiefs (BBC News, 2012) and Iain Duncan Smith’s private sector-led 
welfare reforms (Guardian, 2014). Some concluded that localism was actually 
little more than a masquerade to secrete creeping privatisation of the Welfare 
State and referred to a history of local initiatives being colonised by outside 
business interests, a practice that had all but driven out non-profit and mutual 
organisations. Spear, for example, investigating the Stagecoach and Arriva 
transport companies that dominated the market in England after deregulation in 
the 1990s, concluded that ‘the demise of most independent employee-owned 
companies has raised theoretical and strategic issues of their viability’ (Spear, 
1999, p.254). North asked, therefore: 
Could it be, then, that civil society is being set up to fail? That the real 
agenda is privatisation? Will civil society organisations and social 
enterprises either fail to compete with larger, more heavily resourced 
private sector organisations in competitive tendering processes or, in time, 
find the burden of service delivery is too great and find offers of private 
sector support attractive? … In this case, the winners will be the wide 
range of private companies that routinely bid for public sector contracts. 
Councils will find it more convenient to outsource to private sector 
companies with experience and resources, and an unprepared third sector 
will not be competitive in such an environment. (North, 2011, p.823) 
 
Durkheim had argued that the state ‘should not do everything, but it should not 
let everything be done’ (Durkheim, 1885/1986, p.88). The concern of Big Society 
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critics was what level of accountability would remain if state subsidies for local 
services dwindled and became dependent upon local voluntary action. This worry 
was not helped by the prospect by the removal of regulatory bodies, like the 
Competition Commission, the Food Standards Agency and the Gambling 
Commission, that were deemed unaffordable at the time (see North, 2011, p.820; 
House of Commons, 2011, p.50). Moreover, when privatised, at what level would 
state protection operate if a provider wished to close a service because of its lack 
of profitability, and in what way could the state be accused of culpability in 
refusing to act as guarantor of basic and equal provision (see Levitas, 2012, 331)? 
Put simply, because power withdrawn from the state seemed more likely to shift 
to corporate stake holders, the move to localism and community regeneration 
appeared more as deliberate underfunding and a smoke-screen for increased 
privatisation. 
 
Communities and colonization 
 
At the heart of Big Society thinking was a notion of rejuvenated communities.  
However today urban communities in particular are plural and often transitory 
in nature making them quite distinct from Burke’s platoons or Owen’s idealised 
communities that were geographically and, arguably, socially more cohesive. 
Some like Etzioni maintain that the term can still be defined with reasonable 
precision: 
Community has two characteristics: first, a web of affect-laden 
relationships among a group of individuals, relationship that often 
crisscross and reinforce one another (as opposed to one-to-one or chain-
like individual relationship); and second, a measure of commitment to a 
set of shared values, norms, and meanings, and a shared history and 
identity – in short, a particular culture. (Etzioni, 2015)  
However others like Stacey argue that because of the complexity associated with 
the term the solution was to avoid it (Stacey, 1969). In part this was because 
increasing social and cultural diversity made it incomprehensible to consider 
England as a single community; it was now, in Parekh phrase, ‘a community of 
communities’ (Runnymede Trust, 2000): 
Since it is constantly exposed to external influences and its members do 
not share a moral and cultural consensus, it cannot aspire to be a single 
cultural unit and base its unity on the cultural homogeneity of its citizens. 
It cannot claim to embody and legitimate itself in terms of their sense of 
collective identity either, both because many of them no longer place 
much emphasis on their national identity or privilege it over their other 
identities, and because some of them increasingly have and cherish 
transnational ties and identities. (Parekh, 2002, p. 53) 
In other words, because of globalisation, post-colonial migration and increasing 
population mobility, many citizens now have multiple identities (see Kymlicka, 
2003: Kerr et al., 2002) such that today one can be English, British, a Muslim, a 
member of the EU, and thus have a commitment to another country by birth or 
marriage simultaneously.  
 
Not only is community a more complex term than in Burke’s day, the effects of 
global capitalism upon it have been penetrating. Habermas has tried to account 
for the interaction between such communities and modern economies by 
classifying the Lebenswelt (the lifeworld or ‘community’) and the economic and 
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political system as two distinct spheres of social interaction. The former he 
describes as ‘the reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken convictions that 
participants in communication draw upon in cooperative processes of 
interpretation’ (Habermas, 2006, p. 124). This constitutes the realm of tradition, 
custom and convention, the sole source of norms, values and civic pride, the very 
domain that the Big Society wished to rekindle. While he has been criticised for 
portraying this sphere in terms of romanticised communicative practices, rather 
than as a realm of contrasting social identities and competing values where forms 
of domination and power operate (see Gibson, 2013), he convincingly contrasts 
the lifeworld’s socially integrating function to systems media in advanced 
capitalist societies. For systems, in contrast, constitute a very different realm of 
social action insofar as they survey the world merely in terms of quantities and 
employ instrumental rationality to do so (see Gibson, 2011). While Habermas 
misguidedly portrays the lifeworld as if it were in Manichaean opposition to 
systems media, a ‘sphere of freedom in contrast to a sphere of domination’ 
(Jessop, 2003, p.7), he describes convincingly the way systems media tend to 
overwhelm the lifeworld in which spheres of legitimacy-generating 
communicative action are displaced or sequestered. ‘Colonisation’ occurs because 
instrumental rationality surges beyond the bounds of the economy and state 
bureaucracy into areas of communicatively structured life where it achieves 
dominance ‘at the expense of moral-political and aesthetic-practical rationality’ 
(Habermas, 2006, p. 304-305). In essence, colonisation by systems helps account 
for the weakening of communities and the increasing marginalisation of ‘norm-
conforming attitudes’: 
In modern societies, economic and bureaucratic spheres emerge in which 
social relations are regulated only via money and power. Norm-
conforming attitudes and identity-forming social memberships are neither 
necessary nor possible in these spheres; they are made peripheral instead. 
(ibid., p. 154) 
 
This narration of the way the economy and state penetrate ever more deeply into 
the symbolic reproduction of communities helps explain how shifts in economic 
and political power affect cultural and local communities. Changes in retail 
banking, for example, have been away from a culture based upon human 
relationships to one based upon transactions and trading. Rising economic 
inequality in England has led to an expansion of second-home ownership that is 
said to brought ‘social consequences’ (Second and Holiday Homes, 2014) that has 
affected the price of housing stock, jeopardised the local infrastructure and thus 
the viability of socially cohesive institutions like local schools and pubs. More 
generally, ‘trust in each other and in our wider society has fallen’ (Blond, 2011; 
see also Pattie, Seyd & Whiteley, 2004). However, while Blond flagged up the 
problem, in practice the Big Society failed to account adequately for its decline 
and for the impact deregulated markets have upon the social fabric. The rise of 
what Macpherson called ‘possessive individualism’ (Macpherson, 1962) is not 
answered by visions of communitarianism that fail to account for the constant 
buffeting by systems of power that, in Habermas’s terms, jeopardise ‘norm 
conforming attitudes and identity-forming social membership’. In other words, 
Tönnies nineteenth century vision of Gemeinschaft (Tönnies, 2002), as an all-
encompassing community that members unreflectively endorsed, seems 
‘distinctly ill-suited for complex and conflict-ridden large-scale industrialized 
societies’ (Stanford Encyclopedia, 2014). Put simply, how Burke’s little platoons 
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would fare today against a backdrop of short-sellers, speculators and the prospect 
of foreclosure from multinational banks is highly questionable. 
 
In such a context, the claim by Big Society advocates that there were ‘large 
numbers of people willing to get involved’ (Wei, 2010, p. 6), or Blond’s assertion 
that there was ‘a massive demand from local communities to run public services’ 
(New Statesman, 2010), is at best doubtful. Indeed, Sloam found that ‘the 
empirical evidence does not support this claim’ (Sloam, 2012 p.102) while Pattie 
and Johnson argued that there has been only a ‘lukewarm enthusiasm for public 
participation in civic life’ (Pattie & Johnston, 2011, p.143; see also Hudson, 2011). 
Not only were the numbers of civic actors low but, because of time constraints, 
family commitments and the pressures of employment, those available and 
willing were shown to be spread unequally across communities: ‘Localities vary 
greatly in the economic and cultural resources of the people who live in them, as 
well as in their material character, and thus in the available resources for 
absorbing the additional labour implied by the Big Society’ (Levitas, 2012, p.331). 
The Institute for Volunteering Research found that ‘rates of formal volunteering 
vary greatly by socio-economic classification. In 2007/08 those in higher/ lower 
managerial and professions were the most likely to formally volunteer’ (Institute 
for Volunteering Research, 2014). In other words, issue of unequal wealth, 
expertise or time meant that the better educated and retired middle class were 
more active in volunteering (see Pattie & Johnston, 2011, p.415; Lowndes & 
Pratchett, 2012, p. 32; Hudson, 2011, p.21), while ‘people classified as being at 
risk of social exclusion (defined here as having a long-term limiting illness or 
disability, having no formal qualifications, or being from an ethnic minority 
group) were less likely to regularly participate in volunteering’ (TimeBank, 2014). 
 
Depoliticising philanthropy and citizenship education 
 
Big Society reasoning coincided with a broader tendency in Conservative policy 
towards the political advantages of diverting risk. This involved a process of ‘off-
loading’ that meant that local providers, like schools and charities, could be 
policed by central government and, if required, blamed for inadequate provision:  
Cameronism could be read as a particular type of statecraft designed 
primarily to service the continuation of power and the maintenance of 
political office by reducing the risks of policy failure... Importantly, the 
concept of depoliticisation should never be taken to imply an absence of 
governmental control or the absence of politics itself. Quite the opposite; 
depoliticisation is about finding new means of control at a distance. (Kerr, 
Byrne & Foster, 2011, p.199-200) 
The implication here is the state has not withdrawn to devolve power to local 
communities but externalised its responsibility for service delivery by placing the 
burden of failure onto others (see Milbourne & Cushman, 2012). In countering 
such moves, the Charity Commission recently launched a counter offensive to 
draw attention not only to the depletion of its resources but against ‘direct 
attacks by Government and others on the freedom of expression of voluntary 
bodies working with the state’ (Baring Foundation, 2013, p.3). What they choose 
not to emphasise, however, is that while charities have had to make choices about 
the extent to which they work in financial partnership with government for fear 
of losing a critical footing on policy, many of these ‘depoliticised’ bodies now 
operate as proxy suppliers providing at lower cost what used to be state services 
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(from home help to palliative care) and today cannot escape the pretence of 
active engagement in the political process. Furthermore, the link with politics is 
even more evident in countries like the US with the rise of mega-charities. While 
England has so far escaped the excesses of philanthropy on the scale of the Gates 
Foundation, now worth more than $43 billion, it raises serious political issues 
concerning questions of accountability, the challenge to democratic institutions, 
as well as the legitimacy of what is in effect a body so powerful it can substitute 
for government in its pursuance of foreign policy (see Gibson, 2008, p.64; 
Frumkin, 2006; Katz, 2007): 
This brings to the fore an inherent tension regarding the role of 
philanthropy in the Big Society. Philanthropic donors are encouraged to 
bring resources which can enable the Big Society to flourish. These 
resources epitomize social action which, within the Big Society, is integral 
to citizen empowerment and control over public services and 
communities. However … emerging philanthropic relationships risk 
enhancing rather than addressing unequal power relations in civil society 
and between state, market and civil society. They legitimate the 
predominantly market-led forces which give rise to the need for 
philanthropy in the first place and affect the transformative potential of 
philanthropy, that is, whether it encapsulates the need for, and has the 
capacity to ensure, social change. What is more, they stifle the 
development of a democratic counter-discourse about the role and 
practice of philanthropy. (Daly, 2011, p. 1080-1) 
 
Education has also been subjected to a similar process and depoliticisation has 
clearly influenced the recent revisions to the Nation Curriculum for Citizenship in 
England (National Curriculum, 2014). Frazer argued that ‘citizenship is, properly 
speaking, a political relationship’ and that ‘it has become something of a standard 
complaint by educationalists and political theorists that citizenship education is 
consistently depoliticised’ (Frazer, 2007, p. 257). One of the central tenets of the 
Crick Report (1998), which underpinned the previous national curriculum 
(DfEE/QCA, 2000), was to engender more community activism in pupils:  
There are worrying levels of apathy, ignorance and cynicism about public 
life. These, unless tackled at every level, could well diminish the hoped-for 
benefits both of constitutional reform and of the changing nature of the 
welfare state. To quote from a speech by the Lord Chancellor…: ‘We 
should not, must not, dare not, be complacent about the health and future 
of British democracy. Unless we become a nation of engaged citizens, our 
democracy is not secure’. (Crick Report, 1998, p.8) 
More than a decade later some have concluded that the programme for civic 
engagement of school-aged pupils ‘must be seen as a failure’ (Sloam, 2011, p.101). 
Youth turn-out at UK elections over the last twenty years has reached such a low 
profile that it now ‘ranks 21st of 22 European countries’ (Sloam, 2012, p.96). In 
2008 a longitudinal survey carried out by the National Foundation for 
Educational Research suggested that while ‘the important fact to underline about 
the introduction of citizenship education is that one of its key aims is the 
development of young people’s trust’ (Benton et al., 2008, p.30), it observed the 
opposite, i.e. ‘declining levels of trust in authority figures and institutions, 
including family and teachers’ (ibid, p.vii). To grasp the enormity of Crick’s 
anxiety for the levels of apathy and cynicism in the young one would need to set 
aside crude invective concerning the duty of young citizens to becoming more 
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active, responsible and charitable, and devise a curriculum that responded to the 
complex reasons for political and civic disengagement, including the link 
between the media and politicians through to the lack of trust in the mainstream 
political process (see Gibson, 2015, forthcoming).  
 
However from September 2014 the state required that all maintained schools in 
England adopt a revised curriculum for citizenship (National Curriculum, 2014). 
This chose to emphasise civics or the learning of ‘facts’ about the British 
Constitution, like ‘the operation of Parliament’, ‘the justice system’ and ‘the 
functions and uses of money’. Putting aside the paradox of a national curriculum 
and a powerful state inspection service during a time of apparent localism, 
Michael Gove MP, then Secretary of State for Education, said: ‘I'm not going to 
be coming up with any prescriptive lists, I just think there should be facts’ (Gove, 
2011). Facts, however, shroud what Clark aptly calls ‘the bias beneath the facts’ 
(Clark, 2012). To illustrate the point, the Crick Report referred to the distinction 
between ‘law and justice' that in principle opened up the possibility of political 
difference and contestation (Crick Report, 1998, para. 2.4). Thus one might 
acknowledge the ‘fact’ of Ghandi's two hundred mile civil disobedience march to 
the sea to collect salt and avoid paying the coloniser's taxes, but this fact merely 
raises more complex questions concerning the rule of law and whether such 
action was illegal but just. Teaching facts cleansed of politics is arguably not only 
epistemological questionable in educational contexts, it does little for the 
regeneration of trust or the revival of pupils’ civic engagement, said to be 
fundamental to the Big Society project.  
 
Conclusion 
 
On my route to work I cycle through the villages of Limpley Stoke, Freshford and 
Midford south of Bath on a path that was formerly a railway track. This was the 
set for a 1953 Ealing comedy by Charles Crichton called The Titfield Thunderbolt. 
Filmed during what seems like an idyllic English summer, it is a story of how a 
group of villagers fight to retain and operate their local branch line when 
threatened with closure by central government. In order to do so they require 
financial support and find it in a local retired businessman, a philanthropist and 
alcoholic played by Stanley Holloway attracted by the prospect of an ever-open 
railway bar. The villagers also have to overcome the opposition of the local bus 
operator, Pearce and Crump, a benign version of Arriva today, with much of the 
film focussing on the machinations and disasters between these waging factions. 
It is a charming film where local initiative is shown to triumph over Big 
Government that leaves the viewer with a rosy glow of little England in a bygone 
age. However, mirroring the concerns raised by this paper about Big Society 
rhetoric the film leaves many questions unanswered, such as the appropriate role 
of the state, the nature of self-interested philanthropy, the limitations of 
unbridled competition within a context of monopoly capitalism, and the nature of 
community where the structure and cohesiveness of Burke’s ‘little platoons’ 
appear thwart with division and social hierarchy and far from idyllic. The original 
film succeeds, suggests Barker, only because ‘it has the support of local privilege 
and local wealth that is accepted by a small town which is socially homogenous 
save when divided by the bribes and machinations of capitalism’ (Barker, 2011, 
p.50-1). One wonders what a Big Society filmic equivalent of The Titfield 
Thunderbolt might look like today.  
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